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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff Richard Ross to modify 
a California divorce decree, with a counter-claim by Carol 
Ross for judgement as to arrearages in child support and 
alimony. The State of Utah, Department of Social Services, 
joined the action with a claim against plaintiff for reimb-
ursement of welfare paid to defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried by the lower court sitting without 
a jury which modified the divorce decree in favor of plaintiff 
and granted judgement for defendant on the counter-claim and 
order to show cause in the amount of $24,457.00, representing 
arrearages of alimony and child support, and after giving 
plaintiff credit for alimony payments in the amount of $5,000.00 
as money paid by plaintiff towards a down payment on a home 
purchased by the two parties. Judgement was also granted for 
the State of Utah, Department of Social Services, in the 
amount of $1,544.00 representing reimbursement of welfare paid 
to defendant, Carol Ross. 
Plaintiff appealed that part of the lower court judgement 
granting defendant $24,457.00 in arrearages and the State 
$1,544.00 in reimbursement. 
Defendant is not appealing the part of the judgement or 
order modifying the California divorce decree as indicated in 
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plaintiff's brief, but is appealing that part of the courts 
decision granting plaintiff credit in the amount of $5,000.00 
towards the alimony arrearages. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent and Cross-Appellant, Carol D. Ross, seeks 
an affirmance of the judgement of the lower court against the 
Plaintiff-Appellant Richard Ross for $24, 457. 00 in arrearages 
of alimony and child support and further asks that the court 
overturn the lower courts decision to grant a credit to plain· 
tiff in the amount of $5,000.00 toward alimony arrearages, 
representing the amount paid by plaintiff toward the down pay-
ment of a home purchased by the parties. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, hereinafter 
referred to as defendant, or Mrs. Ross, does not agree fully 
with the statement of facts as presented by plaintiff and will 
herein recite her interpretation of the facts and will speci· 
fically refute facts set forth in plaintiff's brief which 
she controverts. 
The parties final divorce hearing was held on February 
19, 1971 in California, wherein defendant was awarded alimony 
of $150. 00 per month and child support of $100. 00 per month 
for each of three children. Plaintiff, Mr. Ross was present 
at the divorce hearing and heard the court order him to pay 
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the amounts specified above. (T. 7, 34) 
On February 20, 1971, only one day after the divorce 
hearing, Mr. Ross left the State of California and moved to 
Dallas, Texas specifically to avoid the obligations of the 
divorce decree and to hide from Mrs. Ross and any one who 
would try to enforce plaintiff's obligations under the decree. 
(T. 9,10,82,155) To be certain that no one would find him 
plaintiff lived under an alias or an assumed name, Richard 
Henderson. (T. 6,10,155) He lived in Dallas, Texas for 
approximately 5 years (T. 10) 
Mrs. Ross did not hear from Mr. Ross until October of 
1972, at the earliest (T. 60), and Mr. Ross continued to 
conceal his whereabouts to defendant in their few conversations 
by telling her that he was living in Colorado rather than 
Dallas, Texas. (T. 34,60,70) 
Plaintiff and his mother Mrs. McKendrick, testified --
that plaintiff sent to his mother on the average $200.00 a 
month until August of 1972 for the benefit of plaintiff's 
children. (T. 13, 82-87) Defendant on the other hand denied 
ever receiving anything from plaintiff's parents except the 
usual gifts that grandparents give to grandchildren, such as 
on birthdays and Christmas. (T. 15,59) 
It is undisputed that plaintiff never did send any money 
directly to defendant as required by the divorce decree, or to 
the State of Utah on behalf of defendant for either alimony or 
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child support until approximately March of 1973. (T. 35) 
Defendant began receiving from plaintiff at that time very 
small sporadic payments until August 1973 when plaintiff 
started sending $232.00 a month to the Bureau of Recovery 
Services, which in October 1973 he reduced to $225.00 a 
month . (T. 36) These payments were made until pl.aintiff 
moved to Salt Lake permanently in February of 1976. 
Plaintiff testified that a Mr. Theodore Zambos of the 
Bureau of Recovery Services, acting as agent of the State and 
defendant, relieved plaintiff from all back-payment obliga-
tions to defendant in October 1973, and for any future obli-
gations above $225. 00 a month. (T. 30, 161-164) Mr. Zambos, 
however, testified that it never was his practice to relieve 
a defaulting husband from the obligations under the divorce 
decree, nor did he believe that he had the authority to do so 
(T. 115,117,119,121) 
Certain contacts were made between Mr. and Mrs. Ross 
from October 1972 through December 1975, including telephone 
conversations and a visit by plaintiff to Salt Lake City in 
February 1973. (T.34,60,62-4) During some of those tele-
phone conversations and the February 1973 visit there was sOll! 
discussion about child support payments wherein Mrs. Ross spe( 
fically asked Mr. Ross if he was going to pay the amount that 
the court in California had ordered him to pay and Mr· Ross 
responded that he would never pay that amount. (T. 34 · 67) 
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Defendant testified that she never protested the amount she 
received other than to plaintiff, as she felt that it was 
"hopeless". (T. 135) 
In December of 1975 plaintiff came to Salt Lake to spend 
Christmas with the children and in early February 1976 he 
moved to Salt Lake and has been a resident ever since. There 
Tr-as some discussion in the Christmas visit of 1975 concerning 
plaintiff moving to Salt Lake permanently so that he could be 
around the children, but defendant testified that she was very 
skeptical about plaintiff's return,(T. 48) and did not urge 
plaintiff to come. (T. 140) 
Prior to plaintiff's move to Salt Lake and since the time 
of the divorce the parties never actually discussed "back-
payments" or arrearages of child support and alimony. (T. 18, 
19, 44, 48,68,133-34) Plaintiff did however testify that in 
their conversations defendant led him to believe that he did not 
owe her for back-payments. (T. 162) This testimony, however is 
inconsistent with his earlier testimony that back-payments were 
never discussed. (T. 17, 18) 
Mrs. Ross testified that she was never willing to make 
any concessions concerning the back-payments of alimony and 
child support or the amount that plaintiff was obligated to pay 
per month in the future. (T. 152) 
As plaintiff made preparations to leave Dallas, Texas and 
come to Salt Lake in January or February of 1976 he apparently 
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sold a home that he had been making house payments toward of 
$137. 00 a month (T. 23), and prior to his arrival in Salt Lah 
he had a job secured which he testified paid him approximate!: 
the same salary as he was making in Dal las, Texas. (T. 23 
' 2i, 
Sometime after plaintiff's arrival in Salt Lake, plain· 
tiff and defendant lived together in the same house where defr 
dants parents, Mr. & Mrs. Fred Robinson, were residing, altho. 
the parties did not remarry. (T. 21, 46-48) Plaintiff and de! 
dant lived with the Robinson's until September of 1976 and dur. 
that period of time Mr. Ross paid $400. 00 total to J:A'.r. Robins1 
(T. 95}, while Mrs. Ross was at the same time paying her fath1 
$200. 00 a month. (T. 21-22} All of the food expenses and mos! 
of the other household expenses that Mr. Ross took advantage 
of were paid during that period of time by Mr, Robinson. (T.; 
In September of 1976 plaintiff and defendant bought a 
home together and plaintiff subsequently moved out of the hom1 
two months later. (T. 48} From September 1976 to December Bi 
plaintiff paid the mortgage payments on the home. Mr. Ross 
testified that he always considered the home bought by the 
parties as his home and Mrs, Ross to have no interest therein 
(T. 25-26, 175). and in fact Mr. Ross brought a lawsuit again; 
Mrs. Ross to quiet title and remove her from possession of thi 
home. (T. 182) 
Over the seven years since the divorce plaintiff has gir! 
gifts and provided other benefits to the children and defendar 
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Mrs. Ross testified, however, that much of the payments claimed 
by plaintiff at the trial were made out of a joint checking 
account owned by the parties or from plaintiff's own account 
into which he had deposited defendants earnings. (T. 45,146) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR OR 
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE 
DOCTRINES OF ESTOPPEL AND LACHES DID NOT 
APPLY IN THE INSTANT CASE TO RELIEVE 
PLAINTIFF FROM CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY 
A._-q_p..EARAGES. 
Plaintiff contends that the doctrines of "estoppel" 
and "laches" should apply in the instant case to relieve him 
from alimony and child support arrearages. It is defendants 
position, however, that plaintiffs reliance on these doctrines 
is inappropriate for the following reasons: (1) The standard 
on appeal or scope of review requires that this court affirm 
the lower courts ruling that the doctrines were not applicable, 
(2) The equitable estoppel doctrine requires "representations: 
from defendant to release the arrearages which were not found 
in the instant case, (3) Laches cannot be found from mere 
silence alone on the part of the defendant, (4) Plaintiff has 
not suffered a substantial detriment, and (5) Any alleged 
agreement between palintiff and Recovery Services did not 
constitute estoppel or laches on the part of defendant. 
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A 
Standard on Appeal 
Plaintiff has correctly defined within his brief the 
scope of review and the standard to be applied to this case 
by this court. Since the case involves enforcement of a 
divorce decree obligation it is an equity case. However, as 
this court has noted before on numerous occasions the 
Supreme Court must affirm the trial court unless its decision 
was obviously and clearly against the weight of the evidence 
and there was a clear abuse of discretion. Hall v. Hall, 
7 Utah 2d. 413, 326 P.2d. 707 (1958) 
Another important principle of appellate review is that 
the Supreme Court will, in an equity case respect the trial 
courts opportunity to observe the demeanor and determine the 
credibility of the witnesses in a situation where there is 
conflict in the testimony. In Corbet v. Corbet, 24 Utah 2d 
237, 472 P.2d 430, (1970), the court stated: 
"We recognize the correctness of the 
defendants assertion that under § 9 of 
Article VIII, Utah Constitution, this 
court may review the facts in equity 
cases. Nevertheless, it is well estab-
lished that we make allowance for the 
advantaged position of the trial judge 
in close proximity to the parties and 
the witnesses; and we do not disturb 
his findings and judgement merely because 
we might have viewed the matter differently, 
but would do so only if it appeared th~t 
the evidence clearly preponderat7s a~ainst 
them, or that he has so abused his d7s~re-. e 
tion or misapplied the law, that an inJustic 
has resulted." 472 P.2d at 432,433. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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See also Greener v. Greener, 116 Utah 571, 212 P.2d 194 (J949), 
and Reimann v. Baum, ll5 Utah 147, 203 P.2d 387 (1949), 
As is already obvious from the statement of facts there 
are several places in the record of this case where there is 
a conflict in the testimony. It is especially important to 
note that there is a conflict as to whether defendant made 
certain representations that the arrearages of alimony and child 
support as an obligation of Mr. Ross were relieved or forgiven. 
The trial court apparently chose to believe the testimony of 
Mrs. Ross after observing her demeanor and determining her 
credibility as compared to Mr. Ross. 
B. 
An Application of the Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel 
Requires Representations from Defendant to Release or 
Forgive Arrearages which were not Present in the 
Instant Case 
1. The Applicable Law and Defendants Conduct 
The other briefs filed in this case note that the 
elements of estoppel generally include some action on the 
part of one party to induce another into a position where he 
suffers some substantial detriment or damage. J.P. Koch, Inc. 
v. J.C.Penny Co, Inc., 534 P.2d 903 (Utah 1975), Larsen v. 
Larsen, 5, Utah 2d. 224, 300 P,2d 596 (1956), Baggs v. Anderson, 
528 P.2d 141, (Utah 1974). Plaintiff's application of the 
estoppel doctrine to the facts of the instant case seems to Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Mus u  and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 10 -
depend entirely on the case of Larsen v. Larsen, supra. 
The most that can be said about that case, however, is that 
the language in "dictum" required certain "representations" 
or actions on the part of the former wife which would induce 
the former husband not to pay the arrearages and change his 
position to 1his detriment. It should be observed, however, 
that Larsen was not a definitive holding for or against 
either party but a remand to the trial court for further fino 
ings on the issues of estoppel and laches. 
The remand of the case and subsequent Utah cases reveal 
that the facts as found in the instant case are not the kind 
of "representations" sufficient and necessary to invoke the 
doctrine of estoppel. 
The facts in Larsen itself can be clearly distinguishec 
from those herein. In Larsen the former wife brought anacti1 
to enforce back-payments and arrearages against the former 
husband covering a period from 1946 to the filing of the actL 
in July 1955. The former husband alleged and testified that' 
had attempted to make payments of child support as required~' 
the divorce decree but that such payments had been refused b] 
former wife and she allegedly told him that all she wanted 
from her former husband is that he should refrain from tryin1 
see her or the child. The first representation from the 
former wife apparently caine when Mr. Larsen approached her al 
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to what his responsibilities would be to the child if he 
decided to go on a mission for his church and she allegedly 
told him that she would not require him to pay for the child 
while he was on the mission. Mr. Larsen further testified 
that he telephoned his former wife a few years later upon his 
return from the mission and was told that he was not to interfere 
with their lives. Additional facts include that the former 
wife married and her new husband was providing support for the 
child, and that based on the representations of the former wife 
Mr. Larsen also remarried and took on other obligations with a 
new family. The lower court failed to make findings on the 
issue of estoppel and entered a judgement for the plaintiff and' 
as already noted the Supreme Court remanded. 
In plaintiff's brief it is not mentioned that upon remand 
the trial court held that the doctrine of estoppel applied to 
only part of the past-due arrearages in child support but that 
the former husband was still obligated for a five year period, 
1950-1955, and that the eguitable doctrines did not apply for 
the last five years. Mr. Larsen once again appealed to the 
Supreme Court, which affirmed the trial court in the case of 
Larsen v. Larsen, 9 Utah 2d 160, 340P.2d 1421 (1959). This 
latest opinion from the court is very brief and does not indi-
cate which of the facts as they were revealed in the first 
opinion supported the finding that the doctrine of estoppel 
applied to the first three years but not the last five years 
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of the divorce period. 
Plaintiff's reliance on Larsen should encompass h t e fie: 
result before a proper comparison to the facts of the instan: 
case can be made. In Larsen there were fairly clear "reprei. 
tations" which are not found in the instant case or were at 
least not accepted by the trial court. (Finding of Fact No. 
The former wifes statements and requests in Larsen that Mr. l 
leave them alone is quite a bit different from the hopeless 
condition of l'f.rs. Ross herein, who was left alone with the 
children one day after the final divorce hearing. Mr. Ross l 
California to hide out in Dallas, Texas and took on an alias 
assumed name to be certain that no one could find him. (T. ~. 
82, 155) Of course because of the final result in Larsen th1 
same kind of "representations" would not necessarily be suffl 
cient to support the doctrine of "estoppel", even assuming ti 
were present herein. 
Further, the Larsen case must be examined in light of 
later opinions from the Supreme Court that have cited and/or 
distinguished Larsen. In Hall v. Hall, supra, the formen: 
left the State of Utah not too long after being awarded chi'. 
support from a divorce decree. Evidence at the trial reveali' 
defendant tried to deliver support money to plaintiff but co: 
not contact her even by a private detective. The court note: 
that, "it must be conceded that plaintiff kept herself pretr 
much beyond reach." 
f the The trial court granted judgement to defendant or 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 13 -
back payments owed by defendant in Hall, and the former husband 
appealed relying on the first Larsen v, Larsen opinion as 
grounds for overturning the ruling of the lower court. The 
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court and apparently limited 
the Larsen opinion to the requirement that the wife give certain 
"representations" that the husband will not be obligated for 
the back-payments. The court stated: 
"Plaintiff stated that she did not seek 
out defendant to require payment because she 
was trying to enjoy a peaceful life and 
it was not worth it to her at that time. 
Here any similarity to the Larsen case 
disappears. Such statement does not 
reflect any representation to defendant 
that he would not be held accountable 
for the su ort mone as was the basis 
o t e Larsen ecision, Emp ed) 
326 P.2d at 709. . 
A similar case to Hall is McClure v. Dowell, 15 Utah 2d 
324, 392 P.2d 624 (1964), wherein the defendant made regular 
payments based on an Alabama divorce decree but could not make 
the payments for two years solely because the plaintiff con-
cealed herself and the children due partly to a trip to Europe. 
The trial court awarded the past-due child support and defen-
dant appealed saying he was relieved of such payments relying 
on the first Larsen v. Larsen case. The Supreme Court affirmed 
the lower court indicating that they did not think the Larsen 
case appropo, and noted defendant should have sought relief 
in the Alabama forum. 392 P.2d at 625. 
Plaintiff in his brief argues that the overall conduct 
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of Mrs. Ross together with plaintiff's testimony concerning 
the alleged understanding between plaintiff and defendant as 
to back child support is enough to apply the doctrine of 
"estoppel" to the instant case. However, the actions of the 
former wives in both Hall and McClure seem far more aggregioi 
than any actions or conduct of defendant in the instant case. 
For example plaintiff emphasises over and over again in his 
brief that defendant did not contact any State Officials when 
she was aware of plaintiff's address and he points further to 
her conduct in never having filed an action earlier to enforc' 
the arrearages or never having lodged any formal protest or 
complaint. Certainly, however, defendant never did conceal 
herself from plaintiff as in Hall and McClure, but on the 
contrary it was Mr. Ross who hid himself from Mrs. Ross for 
a period of almost two years. Mr. Ross did not have the righ 
to believe he was relieved of any support obligations in the 
instant case merely because Mrs. Ross did not file an earlier 
action or report his whereabouts to the State of Utah. Plain 
tiff's only relief as suggested in McClure , was to modify th 
California decree. 
Another important case since the original Larsen opinio 
is Smith v. Bray, 11 Utah 2d. 217 357 P.2d 189 (1960) wherein 
the lower court granted a judgement for delinquent support 
money payments for a period of 8 years to the former wife. 
that case the former husband testified that he was requested 
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to stay away by his former wife and he further testified that 
he was "led to believe that they did not want anythlng from 
him. " The former husband appealed the lower courts ruling 
and again attempted to rely on the first Larsen v. Larsen, 
opinion. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court, noting 
simply that the instant case amply supported the courts 
finding that there was no "laches or equitable estoppel". It 
is important to note that there was a conflict in the testi-
mony in that case and that the former husband felt that he 
was led to believe that the support obligations wo111ld not be 
required of him. 
The facts in the instant case are somewhat identical 
to the facts in Smith. Mr, Ross testified that the general 
conversations between plaintiff and defendant in the early 
part of 1973 led him to believe that defendant would not 
"hassel" him for back alimony and support as long as he took 
care of the kids. (T. 172-3_) This testimony of plaintiff is 
as firm as he ever becomes in the trial concerning an under-
standing between plaintiff and defendant that all past alimony 
and child support obligations were forgiven. Earlier in the 
trial plaintiff gave the following testimony: 
"Q, 
A: 
(By Mr. Williams} Alright, Now 
from 1971 through to 1975, Mr. Ross, 
did you and your former wife ever 
discuss the amount or the fact th~t 
you owed some back payments of ali-
mony and child support? 
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Q: Never discussed that from 1971 
to 1975? 
A: The conversations we had led me to 
believe that I did not owe her any 
back alimony, 
Q: I am not asking you that, I am 
asking did you ever have a conver-
sation with her about the amount 
that she or that you had an oblig-
for back-payments of alimony and 
child support, 
A: No. 
Q: You never discussed it. O.K, (T. 19) 
Al though the testimony is somewhat confusing plaintiff 
admits that the two parties never actually discussed the fact 
of back payment or arrearages of alimony and child support ani 
from all the testimony given by plaintiff it appears clear th: 
if he was led to believe that he did not owe the back-payment 
it was not based on any "representation" of Mrs. Ross. 
Mrs. Ross' testimony, on the other hand, clearly reveal; 
that the parties never actually discussed back payments and 
the only time the subject of support was discussed related to 
whether Mr. Ross was going to pay the amount required of h~ 
under the divorce decree and his constant response that he wo~ 
never pay that amount, (T. 34, 67, 135) As to whether there wa: 
ever a discussion concerning "arrearges" Mrs. Ross testified 
as follows: 
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(By Mr. Williams) In fact 
you have already testified here 
t~day haven't you, that you never 
did have a conversation about back-
payments with the plaintiff until 
you were living together? Isn't that 
true? 
Yes. (see T. 48) 
Well, what concessions were you 
willing to make about back-payemnts 
at that time (late December 1975 and 
early January 1976), if any? 
~wasn't willing to make any concess-
ions. How can you forgive something 
like that? That's a lot of debt. 
He owed me a lot of money. 
The testimony of Mrs. Ross is credible for many reasons 
including the fact that one day after the divorce hearing she 
found herself alone in terms of supporting herself ~nd the 
children and plaintiff deliberately concealing his whereabouts 
to defendant until sometime in 1973. 
Mrs. Ross further testified that from the time that she 
first came in contact with ~.r. Ross after the divorce until the 
time that he moved to Salt Lake in February of 1976 that there 
was never an agreement or understanding between the two parties 
that he need not pay her any alimony, or that he need not worry 
about paying more than the $225.00 a month that he was paying 
since October 1973. (T. 44) 
On page 16 of plaintiff's brief he states that defendant 
was not "truthful" in testimony that she gave earlier in the 
trial and refers to a dialogue betweem Mr. Sykes and her to 
prove her alleged inconsistency about conversations between 
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plaintiff and defendant concerning "back-payments". An 
obvious reading of the dialogue however reveals that the 
parties talked only about the future child support Mr. 
Ross was going to pay and did not relate to "back-payments" 
at all. 
Mrs. Ross does not deny that the parties talked about 
child support but is very emphatic about the fact that all 
the conversations related to payments Mr. Ross was going to 
make in the future. Hence there is never any inconsistency 
in her testimony. Prior to the conversations referred to, 
plaintiff had made absolutely no efforts to pay defendant 
any "alimony" or "child support" and the conversations bet· 
ween the two at that time referred to what Mr. Ross was goini 
to start providing for the children and as Mrs. Ross testifiE 
Mr. Ross was very adamant about the fact that he would never 
pay the amounts set forth in the decree. (T. 34, 67, 135) 
One final decision handed down after the original ~ 
opinion that is worth noting is French v. Johnson, 16 Utah 2d 
358, 401 P.2d 315 (1965). In that case plaintiff brought pR 
ceedings against defendant to collect back-payments for a ten 
year period. The lower court relieved the defendant of past 
payments applying the doctrines of "estoppel" and "laches". 
The former wife appealed and as noted in the Supreme Courts 
opinion the case of Larsen v. Larsen was discussed at great 
length. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court and state' 
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"The facts show no representation 
eit~er.explicit or implicit, by ' 
plaintiff to defendant with respect 
~o ~iscontinuation of payments, and 
it is doubtful if such circumstances 
would be of prime imaortance. Mere 
silence over a perio of time will 
not raise an estoppel where there is 
no legal or moral duty to speak. The 
court did not condition the payments 
upon a request for such by plaintiff." 
(emphasis added) 401 P.2d at 315-316. 
In the instant case the lower court undoubtedly chose 
to believe Mrs. Ross when there was conflicting testimony as 
to whether certain representations were given. In the absence 
of representations plaintiff can only point to "mere silence" 
on the part of defendant and as clearly noted in French Mrs. 
Ross never had a legal or moral duty to seek after the unpaid 
amounts as the divorce decree did not award alimony and child 
support payments contingent upon the request of the former wife. 
2. The Effect of the Alleged Reconciliation 
Finally it should be considered whether the supposed 
reconciliation between plaintiff and defendant in February of 
1976, resulting in their living together until November of 1976, 
constitutes enough of an implied representation or understanding 
that the prior obligations in arrears for alimony and child 
support would be forgiven or cancelled by defendant. Defendant 
testified that she never did urge plaintiff to come to Salt Lake 
City to live with his family again, and in fact was always 
skeptical about plaintiff's desire to move back in with the 
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family. (T. 4 7, 148) Part of defendant's testimony on this 
point is as follows: 
"Q: Will you please tell us what "Our 
reactio~ was, your feelings w~re, 
about Dick Ross moving back to 
Salt Lake? 
A: I was very skeptical about it. 
There had been a lot of things 
happen in the past. I had to 
struggle and scratch for a long 
time." er. 47) 
Further Mrs. Ross testified that they did not even 
start living together as "man and wife" until plaintiff had 
been living in the Robinson's home for about a month, (T. 14: 
It is obvious that defendant was willing to try the relation· 
ship again, but it is also obvious from her testimony that sl 
was not willing to concede and forgive Mr. Ross that easily. 
Mrs. Ross had no reason to forgive all of the arrearage 
merely because plaintiff was going to move back in with the 
family. For two years Mr, Ross had concealed his whereabout: 
to the family and when he started making payments it was on'. 
own terms as he made it very clear to Mrs. Ross that he wouli 
never pay the amount set forth in the decree. (T. 34, 67) 
If the alleged reconciliation of the parties is suffic'. 
for an application of the doctrine of "estoppel" such holdir« 
would apparently allow a former husband like Mr. Ross to rel:' 
a past obligation of many thousands of dollars by a simple gi 
of reconciliation without anything permanent. Under the 
k bl · t · would be erasi plaintiff's theory the bac -payment o iga ion 
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whether the former husband left the day after the alleged 
reconciliation or many years later. Of course the reconci-
liation in the instant case was for a relatively brief period 
of time. 
As further grounds for relieving plaintiff of his 
obligations under the divorce decree or to further show the 
need for estoppel he tries to impress this court with the 
alleged "inequities" dealt to him by the original divorce 
action, and the gains of Mrs. Ross by the decree. This court 
has stated before that it will not look to those matters in 
a case where the wife is seeking a judgement for back-payments 
in alimony and child support. In Osmus v. Osmus, 114 Utah 216, 
198 P.2d 233, (1948), the court stated: 
"The fact that plaintiff received $5,000.00 
for the equity in the home did not excuse 
the defendant from complying with the order 
of the court. The existence of independent 
means might be a factor to be considered by 
the court in fixing alimony or in considering 
a petition for modification of the decree, ... 
but no discretion is left, to a divorced 
husband, to determine whether he should or will 
comply with an alimony decree ... " 198 P.2d 
at 235-236. 
c 
The Doctrine of Laches is not Applicable 
to the Instant Case 
Although plaintiff states that he is relying on the 
doctrine of "laches" to justify his failure to pay much of his 
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the application of the doctrine except as it may be inter-
mingled with the doctrine of "estoppel". Defendant has 
already cited the case of French v. Johnson, supra, wherein 
the court reversed the lower courts decision to relieve the 
former husband on the basis of estoppel and laches. A much 
earlier case that is similar to French is Openshaw v. Opensha· 
105 Utah 574, 144 P. 2d 528 (1943). In that case defendant hai 
failed to make payments regularly to the court as required 
under a modification decree and plaintiff filed an applicatior 
for a judgement covering unpaid installments for a period of 
8 years. The lower court granted a judgement for the plaintii 
in an amount substantially less than the total amount in arrn 
partly because the court through its own motion invoked the 
doctrine of laches on behalf of defendant. The Supreme Court 
reversed and stated: 
"But mere inaction or delay short 
of a period of limitations, in the 
enforcement of payment of an obli-
gation already accrued, without 
more, is insufficient upon which to 
predicate-laches, 
The evid~~~~·~dd~~~d·t~ 0 th~·~ffect 
that on the few occasions when he 
visited the children and their mother 
in California, the plaintiff did not 
harass him for payment of arrearages, 
is not sufficient upon which to con-
clude that she was guilty of laches." 
144 P.2d at 530-531. 
Whether or not Mrs. Ross harassed or hasseled plaintiff 
to a great degree during the telephone conversations concernin 
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support obligations, is irrelevant under the facts and law 
as applied in Openshaw. Clearly, she is not guilty of "laches". 
Further a demand upon the plaintiff for back-payments is 
even less relevant when he states that he will never pay the 
amount he was ordered to pay in the decree. (T. 34,67,135} 
In 24 Am Jur 2d, 865 §758 it is stated: 
"Likewise a demand is not necessary if 
the party ordered to make the payment 
asserts that he will never obey the 
decree." 
The court in Openshaw v. Openshaw, supra, recognized 
that because of the actions of the former husband that it may 
well have induced the belief upon the part of the wife that 
efforts to enforce judgement for the past due alimony would be 
frivolous. Defendant testified that she felt her "protest" 
would be "hopeless". (T. 135} 
As with the doctrine of "estoppel" plaintiff has failed 
to demonstrate sufficient facts suggesting that defendant was 
guilty of "laches" and that plaintiff should be therefore 
relieved from his divorce decree obligations. 
D 
Plaintiff Has Not Suffered A Legal Detriment 
As noted earlier and as fully represented in plaintiff's 
brief an essential element in applying the doctrines of 
"estoppel" or "laches" is that there must be some substantial 
legal detriment suffered by the one relying on the doctrine. 
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This element was noted in the case of Baggs v. Anderson, 
-- supr 
"An essential requirement is that there 
must be some conduct of the obligee which 
reasonably induces the obliger to rely 
thereon and make some substantial change 
in his position to his detriment." (emp-
hasis added). 528 P. 2d at 143. 
Even assuming that the appropriate actions or repre-
sentations are present that would indicate the application of 
the equitable doctrines, plaintiff's reliance therein must 
fail for lack of sufficient detriment. 
Again, an examination of Larsen v. Larsen, supra, is 
valuable as a comparison to the facts of the instant case, 
especially since plaintiff places so much relience on the 
language of that opinion. As already noted Mr. Larsen had bet 
told by his former wife that he need not provide support 
money, and as a result he gave up his earning capacity for 
several years to serve a mission for his church. Further upor 
his return he was given more representations about his need tr 
provide support and he subsequently remarried and undertook 
other obligations that he would have never undertaken had he 
known he was obligated for the prior accrued support money. 
In the instant case Mr, Ross has not suffered any detri· 
ment that is anything like the change of position noted in 
Larsen, and even if he had such a detriment it may not be 
sufficient to invoke "estoppel" or "laches" inasmuch as this 
court found in the second Larsen case that estoppel did not 
apply for the last 5 years that the defendant had not made 
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payments. 
On page 38 of plaintiff's brief he itemizes several 
things which supposedly suggest a detriment sufficient to 
invoke the equitable doctrines of laches and estoppel. Of 
those noted is the fact that plaintiff quit his job in Dallas, 
Texas to move to Salt Lake. Mr. Ross testified, however, 
that prior to moving that he already had a job "lined-up" 
at Ken Garff's in Salt Lake and that he started to work soon 
after his arrival. (T. 23, 27) Having a job at approximately 
the same pay as he was making in Dallas was an important 
consideration to plaintiff before he decided to come to Salt 
Lake as was confirmed by Mrs. Ross in her testimony. She 
stated: 
"A; ... He wanted to check and see 
what wages were like here and see 
if he could find a job. So I sent 
him the yellow pages of the phone 
book. And we had a few telephone 
conversations and he found work 
in Garffs. And the wa~es he said 
were the same as whate was makin 
t ere in Texas, so e move 
(emphasis added), (T. 46) 
A comparison of plaintiff's income tax ~:returns of 1975 
(while still in Dallas) and 1976 (Salt Lake) reveals an increase 
in earnings of approximately $4,000 in 1976, (plaintiff's 
exhibits 10 and'll),but, the W-2 forms for 1975 show a total 
f · · that year that i's somewhat more than the amount o earnings in 
1975 reported income. (Plaintiff's exhibit 10} The documentary 
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evidence concerning plaintiff's income is difficult to rely c 
not only because of the difference in the W-2 forms versus t:. 
income tax returns, but also because plaintiff testified that 
he has performed work "on the side" that was not reported on 
his income tax returns. (T.224-225} 
The important point is that Mr. Ross himself testified 
that he thought his earnings in 1975, while in Dallas, were 
about $12, 000. 00 (T. 27), which would put him slightly under 
his earnings in 1976. Whatever his actual income, he made 
certain before his arrival that he had a job lined up that 
offered similar wages, and plaintiff cannot now claim that 
he suffered a legal detriment in quitting his job in Dallas, 
Texas. 
Plaintiff lists other items of detriment such as rentin: 
a trailer to haul his belongings to Salt Lake, pursuading his 
f't::i:end to drive one of his cars to Salt Lake and buying his 
friend a one-way ticket baek to Dallas. He also includes 
selling his boat and trailer that he testified he could not 
bring to Salt Lake, and finally moving away from many of his 
friends. These particular actions clearly do not reflect the 
kind of detriment or change in position that would allow the 
doctrine of "estoppel" to apply. Plaintiff does not allege 
that ~e suffered any financial loss or gave up any earnings or 
obligated himself for any support obligations that he was not 
d h C 1 . f . d. orce decree. already required to make un er t e a i ornia iv 
'l 
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in Dallas, Texas suggests that he perhaps had the means to 
pay more support to defendant and the family than he was 
contributing. 
In addition to the detriment claimed by plaintiff one 
must examine the benefits derived by plaintiff's move to Salt 
Lake, which is the major action he ties his detriment to. 
For example, plaintiff sold a home in Texas that required a 
monthly payment of $137.00 and upon his arrival in Salt Lake 
he moved into the Robinson home and over a seven (7) month 
period paid only $400.00 and in return received living quarters, 
his meals and all of the benefits attached to the Robinson 
household. (T. 21-23, 93-94} Plaintiff testified that he paid 
$100.00 a month to Mr. Robinson but only produced four $100.00 
checks at trial, (Plaintiff's exhibit 23), and Fred Robinson 
who was called as a witness by plaintiff testified that plain-
tiff never paid him anything over and above the four payments 
of $100.00 submitted as evidence. (T. 95) These facts are 
particularly interesting in light of plaintiff's testimony that 
he now spends approximately $150,00 a month himself for food. 
(T. 22) 
Mr. Ross also claimed as an item of detriment that he 
purchased a home with defendant in September of 1976 and paid 
most of the down payment of $5,000.00. The very fact that the 
home was not purchased until September of 1976 and that plain-
tiff had arrived in Salt Lake some seven months earlier reveals 
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that this is not the kind of detriment plaintiff can rely 
on as another element of estoppel, assuming that there was 
some type of representation or some type of understanding 
necessary for the other element of "estoppel" or "laches" 
before the arrival to Salt Lake. Further the home that 
was purchased was not a gift to defendant, which might be c: 
to a legal detriment, but was a home for both parties and 
their children, even though plaintiff did r;:o last long in 
the home as he was there for approximately two months. (T. 4: 
Further, plaintiff, testified over and over again at 
trial that he considered the home as entirely his own and thi 
defendant did not have any interest therein (T. 25-26,175),' 
he even brought a "quiet title action" to remove defendant 
from the premises. (T. 182) It is interesting that plaintif'. 
should consider the purchase of the home as a detriment whil1 
at the same time becoming very adamant as to the ownership 
rights therein. Certainly if everything worked out the way 
Mr. Ross intended, the purchase of the home would be a sub· 
stantial benefit and gain to him under the market conditions 
as they existed then and now. 
"d . n1 Finally, plaintiff attempts to demonstrate a etrl.ll1e · 
by noting that he paid a personal judgement of defendant. 
(Plaintiff's brief p. 38) . It must be pointed out that this 
cannot be considered a "detriment" as required for the appli-
h · incurr' cation of the doctrine of laches and estoppel as e is 
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no further obligations to defendant over and above that which 
he already had. The payment of the personal judgement in 
the amount of $700,00 is only a very small item when compared 
to the amount of money he had not paid prior to that time in 
child support and alimony. Interestingly enough plaintiff 
also claims this payment on the judgement as satisfaction 
of alimony and/or child support which further verifies the 
inapplicability of this payment for a "detriment". There is 
no evidence in the record that defendant agreed to accept 
the foregoing payment as satisfaction of support obligations. 
E 
Alleged Agreement Between Plaintiff and Recovery 
Services Did Not Constitute Estoppel and/or Laches 
Defendant agrees with the State of Utah that the doctrines 
of estoppel and laches are not supported by any alleged agree-
ments between Mr. Theodore Zambos of the Bureau of Recovery 
Services and Richard Ross. For the sake of avoiding repetition 
defendant accepts and supports the arguments and points noted 
by the State of Utah in its brief in support of the overall 
position that the equitable doctrines cannot be applied from 
the facts relating to the contacts between Mr. Ross and Mr. 
Zambos. 
Among those points that will be emphasised in the States 
brief and of which defendant fully supports and agrees with 
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1. The assignment given the State by Mrs. Ross was 
not of unlimited scope but was one restricted in nature and 
not authorize the compromise of "all claims'.' 
2. Notwithstanding the interpretation of the StatE 
authority under the assignment, there was no agreement expn 
or implied whereby the State waived its own or Mrs. Ross' 
arrearages. 
3. The court did not error in allowing testimony o' 
Mr. Zambos on cross-examination as to his procedure as an 
investigator. 
Defendant wishes now to only comment about the probablE 
interpretation of the telephone conversations wherein plainti: 
claims that there was an agreement with Mr. Zambos to relievE 
all "past" alimony and child support obligations belonging tc 
Mrs. Ross. Plaintiff has cited verbatim the testimony of Mr 
Ross on page 29 and 30 of his brief and the State of Utah 
adequately discusses the probable interpreations of this 
conversation in its brief. However, it cannot be over-emphas' 
that the statements allegedly made by Mr. Zambos to Mr. Ross 
do not necessarily relieve plaintiff of all past-due obligatic 
under the divorce decree. The following testimony should aga: 
be examined as given by plaintiff; 
"Q: (By Mr. Sykes) 
with respect --
conversation at 
of the past-due 
Did Mr. Zambos say 
or was there any 
all, any mention 
payments, that the 
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department had paid? 
A: I had asked if I owed anything from 
what I had already paid her, and he said, 
No. 
Q: That was it? 
A: Yeah. Otherwise, I could make payments. 
Q: Did he say anything about the amounts 
accrued prior to the time she went on 
welfare? 
A: No . (T, 164) 
The testimony cited above is not inconsistent with 
the interpretation that plaintiff certainly did not owe 
anything from what he and already "paid" Mrs. Ross and that 
Mr. Zambos did not specifically tell Mr. Ross that he was 
relieved of obligations during the time that she was not on 
welfare. 
Plaintiff's exhibit 16, which is referred to by plain-
tiff as confirmation of the above mentioned telephone conver-
sation does in no way refer to the "arrearages" of alimony 
and child support and in fact there is no mention in the 
exhibit at all concerning "alimony". 
Defendant submits that the more logical interpretation 
of the contact between Mr. Zambos and Mr. Ross is that the State 
of Utah was arranging with Mr. Ross future payments while Mrs. 
Ross was on welfare. 
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POINT II 
ANY AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
AND/OR THEIR AGENTS TO MODIFY FUTURE 
CHILD SUPPORT MUST FAIL FOR LACK OF 
CONSIDERATION AND FOR REASONS OF 
PUBLIC POLICY. 
..., 
Plaintiff alleges that there were certain "agreements" 
that relieved him of his future obligation to pay the total 
amount as required by the 1971 California divorce decree. 
It is first of all claimed that plaintiff and defendant durir 
the telephone conversations from October 1972 to February H: 
and in the Febraury 1973 visit to Salt Lake, agreed or had ac 
understanding to the effect that defendant would not consider 
plaintiff liable to pay the full amount under the divorce 
decree if he would simply start paying support fer the childff 
(Plaintiff's brief p. 14) The testimony used to support thes' 
claims is of course chiefly that of plaintiff and the statem! 
he claims were made by defendant are not altogether clear abo. 
what if any obligation plaintiff is relieved of. (T. 15-17) 
Further there were apparently other telephone conversations 
claimed by plaintiff in the summer and fall of 1973, December 
1975, January 1976, and at various times thereafter that 
allegedly relieved plaintiff of the total obligations of the 
divorce decree for the present and future support payments fo: 
the children. (T. 19, 159, 160-1, 164-5, 172) Mrs. Ross denie: 
that she ever gave Mr. Ross authority to pay less than the 
$450.00 per month required by the decree. 
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One additional alleged agreement that plaintiff relies 
on a great deal in his brief is the one allegedly made by plain-
tiff with Mr. Theodore Zambos of the Bureau of Recovery Services 
of the State of Utah. Mr. Ross claims that he telephoned Mr. 
Zambos and they "agreed" over the telephone that if he paid 
$225.00 a month for child support that would be his only obli-
gation for the past and future. (T. 30-31) As already noted 
in this brief the alleged statements made by Mr. Zambos as 
testified to by Mr. Ross do not relate to the past obligations 
but to the future. (T. 30-31) Plaintiff also claims that this 
conversation and agreement was reaffirmed in a letter sent 
by Mr. Zambos to Mr. Ross on October 4, 1973. (Plaintiff's 
exhibit 16) 
Plaintiff further alleges that Mr. Zambos had the autho-
rity to enter into this agreement with Mr. Ross because Mr. 
Zambos was acting as the agent of defendant having received 
an "assignment of collection of support payments" from Mrs. 
Ross in October of 1972. (Plaintiff's exhibit 4, Plaintiff's 
brief 27-28) 
There should be no question that the agreement allegedly 
entered into in October of 1973 between plaintiff and Mr. 
Zambos and the alleged agreements between plaintiff and defendant 
at various times pertain in some degree to a "modification" 
of future child support. Plaintiff had an obligation under the 
1971 divorce decree to pay $100.00 a month for each of the 
three children and he has never, since the divorce, paid to Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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defendant or to the State of Utah on her behalf more than 
$225.00 - $232.00 per month. 
A well settled principle of Utah law is that the 
former husband and wife may not agree to d"f h"ld mo 1 y c l. suppor 
obligations of the father as established in the court decree. 
This principle was made clear in the much discussed case of 
Larsen v. Larsen, 5 Utah 2d. 224, 300 P.2d 596 (1956): 
"In Price v. Price,4 Utah 2d. 153, 289 
P.2d 1044, we held that because the 
State is interested in the childs welfare 
the parents cannot effectively release 
future payments of support money by 
agreeing with the other to that effect." 
300 P.2d at 598. 
This principle is very clearly related in Baggs v. 
Anderson, supra, with facts that are apparently quite similar 
to the situation as alleged by plaintiff in the instant case. 
In ~ the parties were divorced in Wyoming on June 24, 
1970, wherein the pl.aintiff was awarded $200. 00 a month for 
child support. Defendant made payments through September 
of 1971 but missed the October 1971 payment. Apparently afte: 
several phone calls and conversations plaintiff and defendant 
executed a Wl."itten agreement on November 1, 1971 that if, 
"the defendant would pay the October and November payments, 
(total $400. 00 which he then paid) and promised to make the 
$200. 00 payment for December ($100. 00 of which he later paid) 
he would be relieved from the payment of any further support 
money." 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 35 -
In July of 1972, an action was brought to enforce all 
of the accrued unpaid child support by the former wife, and 
the trial court granted a judgement to plaintiff excepting 
therefrom the amount accruing for half of December 1971 to 
July 1972 applying the doctrine of "estoppel". The Supreme 
Court reversed the lower court and indicated that the doctrine 
of estoppel could not be applied to relieve plaintiff of 
"future" child support obligations. The court stated: 
"From an examination of the facts here 
it will be seen that the defendants claim 
of estoppel relates to the first situation 
stated above: the right to receive current 
and future child support. This claim is 
based primarily on the ayreement si~ned by 
the arties on November , 1971, an state-
ments o the p ainti an Mr. Baggs w ic 
defendant avers had the effect of excusing 
him from paying future paheents of child 
support. This court has eretofore had 
occasion to deal with that problem; and has 
held that the right to receive current and 
future money belongs to the minor children; 
and that it is not subject to being bartered 
away, or estopped, or in any way defeated 
by the conduct of the parents or others . 
.. . . . We furth~~-~b~~~~~·t~t-there are other 
obstacles to the invocation of that doctrine. 
A serious one is that we cannot see wherein 
the defendant ave an consideration for the 
c aune agreement t at e wou not ave to 
pai any future su;~ort moner. That is, he 
neither gave anyt ing of va ue, nor suffered 
any legal detriment for that promise. Under 
the decree he was already obligated to make 
the payments of $200.00 a month. Such an 
agreement to do that which on~ is alrea~y 
required to do does not constitute consi-
deration for a new promise." (emphasis 
added) 528 P.2d at 143. 
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The courts opinion in ~ makes it quite clear that 
plaintiff in the instant case cannot enter into an agreement 
to "modify" any future child suoport obligations because, (: 
it is a violation of public policy, and, (2) must fail becaus: 
the lack of consideration given. Even if the court finds th: 
some back payments or arrearages were somehow erased, it is 
clear that Mr. Ross would still be obligated for $300.00 a 
month child support from the period that the alleged agreeme: 
took place. Therefore, his payments from that period were 
deficient. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF CANNOT SUBSTITUTE BENEFITS 
TO THE CHILDREN OR THE DEFENDANT IN 
SATISFACTION OF SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS 
UNDER THE DIVORCE DECREE. 
A 
The Applicable Law and Alleged Benefits 
Conferred Generally 
Plaintiff claims that as a matter of equity he should 
be given credit for many benefits, gifts and contributions 
made to defendant and to the children over the seven year per 
since the divorce, that were not payments made as required ~1 
the divorce decree to defendant herself. As observed in pla~ 
tiff's brief this court has held that a father and former bu>' 
f for the Obl igations imposed by tt' may not substitute bene its 
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divorce decree. Harris v. Harris, 14 Utah 2d 96, 377 P .. 2d 
1007 (1963), Stanton v. Stanton, 30 Utah 2d 315, 517 P.2d 
1010 (1974). In this respect Utah has apparently followed 
the majority rule as noted in 47 A.L.R 3d 1031, 1035: 
" ..... It can be generally stated that 
most cases have gravitated towards the 
view that a father should not be allowed, 
as a matter of law, credit for expendi-
tures made while the child is in his 
custody or for other voluntary payments 
made on behalf of the child which do not 
specifically conform to the terms of the 
decree." 
In Harris v. Harris, supra, the trial court found the 
defendant, former husband, in contempt of court for wilful 
failure and refusal to abide by the order of the divorce decree 
for the payment of the support money for the minor children. 
The decree required defendant to pay $100.00 per month as 
support. Defendant contended that he was in substantial 
compliance with the court order as he was paying approximately 
$50.00 a month as support, and in addition he was spending 
$10.00 a month on the children and carrying certain medical 
insurance which covered the medical expenses of the children. 
He was also allowing plaintiff the right to claim the children 
as dependants on her income tax returns. In regard to this 
position claimed by defendant the court stated: 
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courts conclusion that defendant should 
be held in contempt is supported by the 
law and evidence." (emphasis added) 377 
P.2d at 1009. 
In Stanton v. Stanton, supra, the court stated that 
the defendant could not "unilaterally" decide that "he would 
not pay the support money and offset it by favors conferred 
upon the children." 517 P.2d at 1014 
Defendant suggests that the language in Stanton would 
require not only a mere "consent" from the divorced wife, 
as suggested by plaintiff 1 but a firm "bilateral agreement" 
that the benefits conferred by plaintiff can be used as a 
substitution of the payments required by the divorce decree, 
and even then it is not certain whether the dictum in the Stan: 
opinion would relieve the husband as there does not appear to 
be a case decided in Utah where benefits have been held to be 
satisfaction for the support obligations. 
In any case the facts here do not reveal a bilateral 
understanding between Plaintiff and defendant to substitute an: 
of the benefits claimed by plaintiff as satisfaction of the 
divorce decree. The items of benefit referred by plaintiff 
will be discussed in the order they appear in defendants exhH'.' 
2, or as otherwise. indicated below. With respect to all of 
the items mentioned there is no evidence in the record that an' 
of the benefits conferred were agreed or consented to by defen· 
dant to be used as satisfaction or in substitution of plaintifi 
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Money Sent to Mrs. McKendrick 
The payments allegedly sent by plaintiff to his mother 
in California while plaintiff was hiding out in Dallas, Texas 
cannot be considered satisfaction of the decree. These pay-
ments are itemized in part in defendant's exhibit 2, schedule 
A. Although plaintiff's mother testified that she used all 
of the amounts sent to her by her son for the benefit of the 
children (T. 82-87), Mrs. Ross denied ever receiving anything 
from palintiff's parents for the benefit of the children except 
the usual gifts that grandparents give to grandchildren, such 
as on birthdays and Christmas. (15, 59} 
Even assuming all of the money was used for the benefit of 
the children, of which there is no documentary evidence to support, 
there is absolutely no evidence in the record that Mrs. Ross in 
any way agreed to consented to accept the benefits and gifts given 
to the children bu plaintiff's mother as substitution of the 
obligations imposed on palintiff in the divorce decree. Mrs. 
McKendrick, the plaintiff's mother testified that she never did 
give any money directly in the form of cash to defendant (T. 91), 
and there is no testimony in the record that plaintiff's mother 
ever told Mrs. Ross that the alleged benefits conferred were 
from money supplied by plaintiff. 
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Checks in Schedule B of Exhibit 2 
Defendant has no quarrel with the fact that most of thi 
checks itemized on Schedule B, can be used as satisfaction o: 
the support obligations of plaintiff and have in fact been 
given credit by the court as admitted to by defendant. Howe•: 
the one check listed to American Airlines and dated June 26, 
1973 should not be considered as substitution for the support 
obligations in the decree, and apparently was not considered' 
by the lower court. Plaintiff explained that this money was 
used for the time he flew his children down to Texas to spena 
two weeks with him. (T. 15) 
Checks in Schedule C of Exhibit 2 
It is interesting to observe that plaintiff claims the 
$400. 00 paid to defendants father, Fred Robinson over a sevei 
month period as satisfaction of support obligations. This 
money was paid during the time that plaintiff was receiving a 
rent free home in which to live by the Robinsons, as well as 
free meals. (T. 21-22.46-48) 
Checks in Schedule D of Exhibit 2 
All of the checks written on Schedule D relate to the 
period of time during which plaintiff and defendant were livii 
together with the children. Plaintiff would like the court 
to believe that the total amount listed on that schedule repr: 
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sents amounts from out of his own pocket and reasonably should 
be used as substitution of the alimony obligations. However, 
defendant made it very clear in her testimony that during much 
of this period of time plaintiff and defendant had a joint 
checking account and during the rest of the time period Mrs. 
Ross would simply give to Mr. Ross the money she received from 
her own employment and he would deposit this money into the 
account in his name for the overall expenses of the two parties. 
(T. 49, 145-146) 
Checks in Schedule E of Exhibit 2 
As in schedule D, most of the checks in Schedule E relate 
to the period of time that the parties were living together 
either with the Robinsons or in their own home. The fact that 
the checks were paid out of the joint funds of the parties 
applies at least until December 1976, 
Checks in Schedule F of Exhibit 2 
Plaintiff lists in this schedule payments to various 
utilities and attempts therein to show a satisfaction of child 
support obligations. Plaintiff admitted in testimony that he 
himself took advantage of the natural gas, the garbage collection 
and the electricity during the time these checks were paid and 
admitted that therefore much of this money must be considered for 
his own support. (T. 175) Furthermore, the checks were again 
paid at the time when the parties mingled their individual sums. 
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Payments on House 
Plaintiff claims satisfaction of the divorce decree 
obligations by the monthly mortgage payments and other pay-
ments in Schedule G. relating to the home purchased jointly\ 
the parties in September of 1976. Plaintiff testified adamari: 
that he has always considered the home that was jointly pure[,. 
ased by the parties as his home and therefore considered defr 
dant to have no interest therein even though she paid approxi· 
mately $700. 00 towards the down payment and the deed shows he: 
as a lawful joint-tenant of the property. (T.24, 175) Plain· 
tiff also testified that even though he wants to claim the 
mortgage payments as satisfaction of support obligations he'' 
not willing to allow defendant the opportunity to deduct fro1 
her income tax the interest paid on the mortgage payments 
(T. 26), and was never willing to concede any interest in the 
home to defendant, and in fact brought a quite title action t: 
remove her from possession of the home. (T. 182 ) This 
testimony reflects the inconsistency in plaintiff's testimon: 
and the general lack of welfare or concern toward defendant 
that plaintiff exhibited. If the mortgage payments and othe 
house payments were in substitution of the amounts required ir 
the decree, plaintiff should have considered the house payment 
to be made by defendant. 
Furthermore, all of the house payments represented ab~ 
to plaintiff assuming everything worked out as he planned, 
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because any payment toward the home would have to be considered 
an investment by him with very little risk. 
Plaintiff paid an additional $5,000.00 toward the down 
payment of the home and this item will be discussed in detail 
in Point IV of defendant's brief. 
Again it should be mentioned that with respect to all of 
the items mentioned above there is no evidence that defendant 
agreed or consented to accept them as "satisfaction" 
assuming any of them are from plaintiff's own money. 
B 
Trial Court Did Not Accept Plaintiffs 
Position on Satisfaction 
The trial court in the instant case apparently was not 
willing to accept all of the aforementioned "benefits" as 
satisfaction of the support obligations. The decision of the 
trial court is amply supported by the very recent Utah Supreme 
Court decision of Ciraulo v. Ciraulo, 576 P. 2d 884 (Utah 1978). 
The facts of that case are strikingly similar to the ones in 
the instant case and reveal that some two years after the 
Ciraulo's were divorced they began living together in Salt 
Lake and this period of reconciliation lasted for approximately 
five months. They again reunited in the early part of 1971 
and continued to live together as a family until January 1974. 
Plaintiff's version of the evidence was that the amount of 
support money unpaid by the defendant was $13,250.00, which 
undoubtedly related to periods of time that the parties lived 
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together. Defendant on the other hand, claimed that during 
the three-plus years they lived together he spent approximate. 
$30, 000. 00 for the support of the plaintiff and his children. 
The court in following the trial court did not adopt the defe-
dants claim for satisfaction. The opinion states: 
"His claim is based on his own testimony 
as to his income during that period and 
on his assumption that it was all paid 
for support of the plaintiff and the 
children. The difficulty with the 
defendant's ar ument is that the trial 
court was not 
osition nor 
ence. Anyone w o as any acquaintence 
with family living will empathise with 
the view of the trial court that the 
defendants position is impractical and 
unrealistic." (emphasis added) 576 P.2d 
at 886. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in granting 
the equity in a home purchased by the two parties in lieu ofi 
judgement for back payments in the total amount claimed. In 
the instant case the trial court correctly refused to accept 
many of plaintiff's claims for satisfaction undoubtedly becau; 
of the uncertainty of the amounts as having been actually givr 
from out of plaintiff's own money, and because of the failure 
of these claims to apply to Utah law. 
c 
Plaintiff Should Not be Relieved from the Divorce 
Decree Obligations during the Time that the Parties 
Lived Together 
Plaintiff raises for the first time on appeal the point 
that he should be relieved of any formal child support and ai: 
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obligations of the divorce decree, from February through No-
vanber of 1976 while the parties lived together, Plaintiff did 
not seek credit for the entire amount during that period at 
the trial court level but instead attempted to show some satis-
faction of the obligations by the various checks introduced at 
the trial. The court has reiterated on numerous occasions 
that it cannot pass on matters raised for the first time on 
appeal. See for example, Simpson v. General Motors Corporation, 
24 Utah 2d. 301, 470 P.2d 399, 401 (1970) 
Apart from failure of plaintiff to raise this point in 
the lower court plaintiff is probably not entitled to the 
benefit of this claim by reasQn of Utah law. Although it is 
not known whether this identical point was raised by defendant 
in Ciraulo v. Ciraulo, supra, clearly the court did not credit 
amounts for the period of time the parties in that case lived 
together. 
Further, the case of Stanton v. Stanton, supra, is rele-
vant to this issue as the defendant and father therein was 
claiming relief from the $100.00 a month obligation that he owed 
for child support during the period that his son was living with 
him for three months. The court in Stanton required defendant 
to pay the $300.00 to plaintiff even though he had paid the 
expenses of the child while living with him during the three 
month period. Defendant sees no reason why the instant case be 
considered any differently. 
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If the court is inclined to relive plaintiff of obli-
gations simply because the parties apparently reconciled and 
lived together, defendant submits that the relief should not 
be afforded during the period that plaintiff and defendant 
resided in the home with defendants parents, the Robinsons. 
For the most part during that period of February through 
September of 1976 the expenses for the home and the meals wer: 
paid by ¥..r - Robinson, with plaintiff's overall contribution 
of $400. 00 and defendants contribution of approximately $1,4u 
(T. 21, 46-48, 95) 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REDUCING 
PLAINTIFF'S ALIMONY OBLIGATIONS TO 
DEFENDANT IN THE AMOUNT OF $5,000.00 
REPRESENTING AN AMOUNT PAID BY PLAIN-
TIFF TOWARD A DOWN PAYMENT OF A HOME. 
Defendant's Cross-Appeal is not based on any part of th1 
modification proceedings regardless of what plaintiff states: 
his brief. The cross-appeal is based only on the question of 
law as to whether plaintiff should be given credit for $5,00~ 
toward alimony as he paid approximately that amount towards a 
down payment of a home purchased by the parties in September 1 
1976. (Conclusion of law No. 5) Defendant fails to see why tl 
particular payment should be considered any differently than' 
other payments claimed as satisfaction that were not granteO' 
the trial court. 
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It should again be observed that plaintiff has considered 
from the very begining that the home purchased by the parties 
was his own home and merely a place for the defendant and the 
children to reside for a period of time, and without giving 
defendant any interest in the home. (T. 24,-26, 175} It has 
always been plaintiff's intention therefore, to fully recoup 
his $5,000.00 payment and to gain whatever equity would accrue 
as a result of that investment. At the same time that plaintiff 
filed the instant action to modify the divorce decree he filed 
the quiet title action already referred to in this brief to 
remove defendant from possession and any interest in the home. 
Nothing in the trial courts order provided defendant directly 
with the use and or ownership of the home. 
Furthermore, there is again no evidence that defendant 
agreed or consented to allow the $5,000.00 payment to be con-
sidered satisfaction of the alimony obligations and because 
palintiff cannot unilaterally confer benefits to the defendant, 
if indeed this is a benefit, as a substitution for the divorce 
decree obligations, the court clearly cormnitted error and abused 
its discretion by allowing this credit to plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant, Mrs. Ross, contends that the trial courts 
decision granting her judgement against plaintiff for arrearages 
in child support and alimony should be affirmed by this court. 
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Plaintiff has not met his burden in establishing that the 
doctrines of "equitable estoppel" and/or "laches" apply in 
the instant case to relieve him from the obligations of the 
divorce decree. The trial court held and the prepondenrance 
of the evidence revealed the fact, (1) there were never any 
"representations" on the part of defendant to relieve or forgi· 
the arrearages. and (_2) plaintiff has not suffered a sufficier 
and substantial detriment to rely on the equitable doctrines. 
Further it is clear that plaintiff cannot rely on any 
alleged agreements entered into between plaintiff and defendar 
or plaintiff and a representative of defendant through the St; 
of Utah to relieve him from "future support obligations" , a: 
such agreements are void for reasons of public policy and fai! 
for lack of consideration. 
The trial court did not commit error in refusing to allt 
many items claimed as satisfaction of the divorce decree obli· 
gations of plaintiff inasmuch as the law in the State of Utah 
does not allow a substitution of benefits or "unilateral" pa)'t0 
to satisfy the divorce decree obligations, and plaintiff didt 
meet his burden in establishing that said payments were actual 
made by him. 
Finally it is defendants position that the trial courti 
commit error in allowing a credit towards the payment of alirnl'. 
in the amount of $5, 000. 00 representing the amount plaintiffi' 
· s in toward the down payment of a home purchased by the partie 
S:eptember of 1976. 
-
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Respectfully submitted, 
STRONG & HANNI 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) copies of the 
foregoing Brief to Robert B. Sykes, Attorney for Plaintiff-
Appellant, 320 South 300 East, Suite 2, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111 and Steven G. Schwendiman, Attorney for Utah State 
Department of Social Services, 150 West North Temple, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84103, this ,;7cJ~y of November, 1978, 
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